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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The economic malaise of the late 1970s was accompanied by 
what many in the public perceived to be a related “technological 
malaise.”1  Much of the responsibility for this perceived innovation 
stagnation was laid at the doorstep of the nation’s patent policy 
which, at the time, vested ownership of patents resulting from 
federally-funded research with the government agency responsible 
for funding the initial research.2  The government was perceived as 
ineffective at licensing out its patents to private parties,3 causing 
discoveries derived from federally funded research to rarely make 
their way to market as commercially useful products.4  Addressing 
these concerns, reformers reasoned that private, not government, 
ownership of patents resulting from federally-funded research was 
necessary to motivate investment and transform discoveries into 
commercially useful products.5  These reforms were manifested in the 
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 1  See Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST: TECH. Q., Dec. 12, 2002, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653. 
 2  Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents 
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663–64 
(1996) (describing the perception of government ownership of patents as a 
“treacherous quicksand pit in which discoveries sink beyond reach of the private 
sector”). 
 3  Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1 (“Nobody could exploit such research 
without tedious negotiations with the federal agency concerned.  Worse, companies 
found it nigh impossible to acquire exclusive rights to a government-owned 
patent.”); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1664 (“If the results of federally-sponsored 
research were to be rescued from oblivion and successfully developed into 
commercial products, they would have to be patented and offered up for private 
appropriation.”).   
 4  Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1 (“[W]ithout that [exclusive licensing] 
few firms were willing to invest millions more of their own money to turn a raw 
research idea into a marketable product.”). 
 5  See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
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Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (the “Act”), which allowed small businesses 
and academic institutions receiving federal research funds to own any 
patents resulting from that research, and to convey exclusive rights to 
those patents to private firms.6 
Although the Act’s primary concern was to encourage private 
investment and innovation, the Act’s drafters also endeavored to 
protect the public from harm, which might result from a private 
firm’s nonuse or unreasonable use of an invention that the public 
had funded.7  To that end, the Act contains two significant 
reservations of government rights.8  First, the federal government 
retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to use 
the patent “for or on behalf of the United States.”9  Second, the 
federal funding agency can, under certain legally prescribed 
circumstances, “march-in” and compel the patent holder to grant a 
license to a “responsible applicant.”10  The federal funding agency 
may exercise its march-in rights sua sponte or at the request of a third 
party.11 
An agency may march-in if it finds that “action is necessary to 
alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by 
the contractor, assignee, or their licensees”12 or if “the contractor or 
assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable 
time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject 
invention.”13  Despite this potentially broad statutory language, no 
 
Biomedicine, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003). 
 6  Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006)). 
 7  35 U.S.C. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to promote the 
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development . . . [and] to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in 
federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the 
public against nonuse or unreasonable use of [those] inventions.”) (emphasis added). 
 8  Id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a). 
 9  Id. § 202(c)(4).  
 10  Id. § 203(a).  
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. § 203(a)(2).  
 13  35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).  The Act also provides two other circumstances under 
which an agency may march-in which are not relevant to this Comment.  See id. § 
203(a)(3) (providing for march-in rights when “action is necessary to meet 
requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and such requirements 
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees”); id. § 203(a)(4) 
(providing for march-in rights when “action is necessary because the agreement 
required by section 204 has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the 
exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of 
its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204”). 
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federal funding agency has ever exercised its march-in rights.14  The 
only agency which has ever been petitioned under the Act’s march-in 
rights provision is the National Institutes of Health (NIH); and, it has 
declined to do so on four separate occasions.15  This has raised 
questions regarding whether there are any circumstances under the 
Act which would ever prompt the NIH, or another agency, to exercise 
its march-in rights.16 
The most recent petition was from a group of Fabry disease 
patients which asked the NIH to use its march-in power to address an 
emergency drug shortage.17  Fabry disease is a rare genetic disorder 
which has only one FDA approved treatment: agalsidase beta, known 
commercially as Fabrazyme.18  Fabrazyme is subject to the Act’s 
march-in rights provisions because the NIH funded the initial 
research that resulted in its discovery.19  The supply of Fabrazyme was 
interrupted in June 2009,20 resulting in massive rationing of the drug 
which has caused a resurgence of the patients’ painful symptoms and, 
allegedly, the deaths of at least three patients.21  In response to this 
health emergency, a group of Fabry disease patients petitioned the 
 
 14  Kevin W. McCabe, Note, Implications of the CellPro Determination on Inventions 
Made With Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-In Right?, 27 
PUB. CONT. L. J. 645, 649 (1998) (“The Government’s march-in right has existed in 
relative obscurity—never used and largely forgotten—since 1964.”). 
 15  See In re Fabrazyme, Manufactured by Genzyme Corp., (Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
2010) (determination), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/policy/ 
March-In-Fabrazyme.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Fabrazyme 
Determination”]; In re Norvir, Manufactured by Abbot Laboratories, Inc., (Nat’l 
Insts. of Health, 2004) (determination), available at  
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Norvir Determination”]; In re Xalatan, 
Manufactured by Pfizer, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health, 2004) (determination), available 
at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/ 
March-in-xalatan.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Xalatan 
Determination”]; In re Petition of CellPro, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health, 1997) 
(determination), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-01.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter “CellPro Determination”]. 
 16  See generally McCabe, supra note 14. 
 17  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  See Robert Weisman, Genzyme Struggles to Recover From Virus, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 
21, 2009), http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2009/09/21 
/genzyme_struggles_to_rebound_from_virus_setback/. 
 21  See Susan Donaldson James, Fabry Disease Patients Get Sicker as Drugs Go Overseas, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/fabry-disease-patients-
sicker-sue-drug-company lifesaving/story?id=14403759. 
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NIH, requesting that the agency march-in and force the drug’s 
manufacturer, Genzyme Corporation, to grant a non-exclusive open 
license to a third party who could then begin manufacturing the drug 
in an attempt to alleviate the shortage.22  The NIH denied the 
patients’ request on the grounds that the circumstances did not meet 
the legal standard necessary to warrant a march-in under the Act.23  
Although Genzyme initially predicted that the shortage would only 
last six to eight weeks,24 full production did not resume until March 
2012.25 
Scholarly literature on the issue of government march-in rights 
has focused largely on the more amorphous question of whether or 
not march-in authority can be utilized as a mechanism to enforce 
drug price controls.26  There is a dearth of literature, however, on the 
narrower question that this Comment seeks to address: given the 
NIH’s determinations in the Fabryzyme case and other prior cases, 
what circumstances, if any, would ever warrant a march-in in order to 
protect the public health and safety?  This Comment will argue that 
the reasoning relied upon in the NIH’s Fabrazyme determination is 
legally incorrect, and, practically speaking, effectively reads march-in 
rights as a public protection mechanism out of the Act.  This 
Comment will demonstrate that the NIH’s interpretation of the Act 
ignores both the plain legal standard set forth in the Act itself as well 
as congressional intent. 
If the NIH changes its interpretation of its march-in authority, 
the agency will help to more effectively protect the public in future 
 
 22  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15. 
 23  Id. 
 24  See Will There Be One Global Recommendation for Supply Allocation of 
Cerezyme® (imiglucerase for injection) and/or Fabrazyme® (agalsidase beta)?, GENZYME SUPPLY 
UPDATE (June 24, 2009), http://supplyupdate.genzyme.com/weblog 
/recommendation-for-supply-allocation-of-cerezyme-imiglucerase-for-injection-
1.html. 
 25  See Sten Stovall, Genzyme Gets Nod From FDA For Plant, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203718504577180782783340816.html (noting that full 
production is expected to resume in March 2012 given the fact that the FDA 
approved the company’s new production facility on Jan. 24, 2012).   
 26  Cf. John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing—A New Twist 
for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 149 (2005) (arguing that the Act does not require reasonable drug prices); see 
generally Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price 
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon 
Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 
(2001). 
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cases similar to the Fabrazyme case.  This Comment will also address 
the procedural, regulatory, and political hurdles facing the NIH or 
another government agency seeking to exercise its march-in authority 
as a means of protecting the public.  These procedural hurdles are 
great, which makes march-in rights a potentially poor tool for use in 
an emergency situation such as the Fabrazyme case.  The lengthy 
process may, in fact, cause the NIH to adhere to its mistaken legal 
interpretation of its march-in authority in future cases where the 
public health is threatened.  This Comment will advocate that reform 
of the Act’s march-in mechanisms is necessary in order to avoid 
future tragedies similar to the Fabrazyme situation. 
The Fabry disease community was forced to endure a dire health 
emergency for nearly three years.  The NIH’s abrogation of its legal 
duty has, at least in part, contributed to the pain, suffering, and death 
of U.S. citizens who would otherwise have had greater access to a 
lifesaving drug which was developed with taxpayer dollars.  This is 
more than a mere mistake of legal interpretation; it is a human 
tragedy.  If the protection that the Act’s march-in rights provision 
provides is insufficient to protect our nation’s citizens from similar 
future tragedies, then Congress must reform the Bayh-Dole Act. 
Part II of this Comment will detail the history of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, focusing on the history of march-in rights and the legislative 
intent behind the Act.  Part III will set forth the specifics of the Fabry 
disease case and present the NIH’s reasoning for declining the 
petition to march-in.  Part IV will argue that the NIH’s decision in the 
Fabry disease case was wrong and that a broader reading of the 
march-in rights provision is legally correct and necessary to protect 
the public health in similar cases.  Part V will examine potential 
reforms to the Bayh-Dole Act that are necessary to avoid similar 
tragedies in the future given the likelihood that the NIH will 
continue to adhere to its mistakenly narrow conception of its march-
in authority.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  MARCH-IN RIGHTS AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
A. March-In Rights History 
President John F. Kennedy first attempted to standardize the 
patent policy of various federal funding agencies in 1963.27  He issued 
a memorandum declaring that the patent rights to all publicly-
 
 27  See Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 
10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963). 
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funded inventions should generally be vested in the federal 
government funding agency.28  The memorandum does, however, 
contemplate narrow situations where it would be in the public 
interest to vest principal or exclusive rights in the contractor 
receiving federal funds.29  In the event that a contractor were to retain 
patent rights, the memorandum noted that the government reserved 
the right to compel the contractor (or its grantee, licensee, or 
assignee) to grant a license to a responsible applicant on reasonable 
terms if such action was necessary “to fulfill health needs, or for other 
public purposes. . . .”30  This policy of maintaining the ability to 
compel a patent holder to grant a license based on unmet health or 
safety needs is a direct precursor to the march-in rights provision 
contained in the Bayh-Dole Act.31  It demonstrates that even before 
the Bayh-Dole Act, government agencies were expected to take action 
when the unreasonable use or nonuse of an invention, the 
development of which was funded by taxpayer dollars, threatened 
public health and safety.32 
These reservations of government rights notwithstanding, the 
general policy prior to 1980 was retention of patent rights resulting 
from federally funded research solely by the federal funding agency.33  
Despite attempts at standardization from both President Kennedy 
and President Richard Nixon, by 1980 each federal funding agency 
had different regulations and requirements for licensing out its 
patents.34  This confusing regulatory scheme, coupled with the 
general ineffectiveness of federal agencies at licensing patents to 
private enterprises, resulted in much of the technology derived from 
government-funded research going unutilized by private industry and 
never making it to market in the form of publicly useful commercial 
 
 28  See id. at 10,944. 
 29  See id. at 10,945. 
 30  Id.  
 31  It should be noted that President Nixon issued a memorandum in 1971 
largely reaffirming President Kennedy’s patent policy, including the retained 
authority of the government to compel the granting of a license based on unmet 
health or safety needs.  See Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent 
Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 26, 1971). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id.; see also James E. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development 
Contracts, 53 VA. L. REV. 564, 568–69 (1967).   
 34  See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public 
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1095, 1097–
98 (1999); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663–64; Ralph C. Nash & Leonard Rawicz, 
George Washington University, Government Contracts, Monograph No. 10, Patents 
and Technical Data 74–78 (1983).   
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products.35 
These perceived inefficiencies (whether real or imagined), 
coupled with a perceived innovation stagnation and the overall state 
of the late 1970s economy, led to calls for reform.36  Reformers in 
Congress believed that, in order to more effectively develop the 
results of federally-funded research into commercially useful 
products, it was necessary to enact a new statutory scheme which 
vested these patent rights exclusively in the private sector and allowed 
for the transfer of these rights to other private entities.37  This 
solution would serve a number of goals.  It would: (1) ensure the 
effective transfer and commercial development of patents resulting 
from government-funded research; (2) “reinvigorate U.S. industry by 
giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas[;]” and (3) “ensure that U.S.-
sponsored research discoveries were developed by U.S. firms” rather 
than foreign competitors.38  The resulting legislation is codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006) and is commonly known as 
the Bayh-Dole Act. 
The Bayh-Dole Act thus established a government-wide policy 
that allowed recipients of federal funds to retain ownership of any 
patents resulting from their research.39  The stated goals of the Act 
are: 
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from 
federally supported research or development; to encourage 
maximum participation of small business firms in federally 
supported research and development efforts; to promote 
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit 
 
 35  See McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1098 n.8 (noting that prior to Bayh-
Dole only four percent of all government patents had been licensed).  Critics have 
argued that this view is “elusive at best” and that prior to Bayh-Dole patent rights 
were available to all on a come-one-come-all basis.  See Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 
640–41 n.46; see also Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act 
and the Hopkins v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 
239 (2000) (“[I]t is unclear how much, if any, the Bayh-Dole Act has contributed to 
the successful commercialization of government funded inventions.”). 
 36  See Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1. 
 37  See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663–64. 
 38  Id. at 1664–65. 
 39  35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2010).  Although the Act initially only allowed small 
businesses and non-profit organizations to retain ownership rights in patents 
resulting from federally funded research, in 1983 President Reagan expanded the 
scope of the Act by executive order to cover all federal government contractors, 
including large corporations.  See Presidential Memorandum to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Government Patent Policy, 1983 PUB. 
PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983).  Congress later codified this policy in 35 U.S.C. § 210(c). 
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organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small 
business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering 
future research and discovery; to promote the 
commercialization and public availability of inventions 
made in the United States by United States industry and 
labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient 
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs 
of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or 
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of 
administering policies in this area.40 
In terms of stimulating the commercial development of 
discoveries derived from government-sponsored research, the Act has 
been “consistently hailed as an unqualified success.”41  The Act has 
“fostered a potent four-way partnership between researchers, their 
institutions, government, and industry . . . creat[ing] a powerful 
engine of practical innovation, producing many scientific advances 
that have extended human life, improved its quality, and reduced 
suffering for millions of people.”42  The Act is generally credited with 
the ten-fold increase in patents granted to universities between 1980 
and 1997, compared with a two-fold increase in overall patenting 
during the same time period.43  Biomedical research in health-related 
fields accounts for a major share of these university patents, 
particularly in terms of licensing revenues, a majority of which is 
publically funded.44 
While the Act has certainly been successful at its stated goal of 
promoting increased commercialization of federally funded 
research,45 questions remain as to the ability of the current statutory 
scheme to effectuate one of the Act’s primary stated goals: that of 
“protect[ing] the public against nonuse or unreasonable use” of 
 
 40  35 U.S.C. § 200 (emphasis added). 
 41  Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1708–09.  But cf. Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 
640–41. 
 42  Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 26, at 150. 
 43  See D.C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: 
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 104 (2001). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id.  But cf. Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 640–41.  Many commentators have 
also questioned the desirability of fostering such close ties between industry and 
academia and argue that Bayh-Dole has fostered an incentive structure which 
increasingly encourages universities and other entities to patent “basic research” 
which is properly left in the public sphere as patents on such research could hinder 
technological progress in the future.  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 290. 
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those inventions.46  In order to balance the commercial goals of the 
Act with the interests of the broader public, the Act contains two 
significant reservations of government rights over inventions arising 
from federally funded research.47  First, the federal government 
retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to use 
the patent “for or on behalf of the United States.”48  Second, the 
federal funding agency can, under certain legally prescribed 
standards, march-in and compel the patent holder to grant a license 
to a “responsible applicant.”49  An agency may take action on its own 
or upon the request of an interested third party in the form of a 
petition.50 
In order to march-in under the Act, one of four legal standards 
must be satisfied, two of which are relevant for the purposes of this 
Comment.51  The two relevant standards provide that an agency may 
march-in if it determines that such action is “necessary” (1) “because 
the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take 
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical 
application of the subject invention”52 or (2) “to alleviate health or 
safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, 
assignee, or their licensees[.]”53 
The plain language of the Act therefore demonstrates that 
march-in rights, along with the ability of the government to use an 
 
 46  35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). 
 47  See id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a). 
 48  Id. § 202(c)(4). 
 49  Id. § 203(a). 
 50  Id. § 203(b). 
 51  See, e.g., id. § 203(a)(3)–(4).  These provisions allow for a march-in when an 
agency determines action is necessary (1) “to meet requirements for public use 
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied 
by the contractor, assignee, or licensees” or (2) “because the agreement required by 
section 204 has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive 
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of its 
agreement obtained pursuant to section 204.”  Id. at § 203(a)(3)–(4).  Neither of 
these standards involve public health or safety concerns, and are thus outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
 52  The Act defines “practical application” as:  
to manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to practice in 
the case of a process or method, or to operate in the case of a machine 
or system; and, in each case, under such conditions as to establish that 
the invention is being utilized and that its benefits are to the extent 
permitted by law or Government regulations available to the public on 
reasonable terms. 
35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (emphasis added). 
 53  Id. § 203(a)(2). 
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invention “for or on behalf of the United States,” are the primary 
regulatory mechanisms by which the public is to receive protection 
from the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions funded by 
taxpayer dollars.54  A review of the bill’s legislative history bolsters this 
view, as march-in rights were continually referred to as a means of 
protecting the public during hearings on the bill.55  Contemporary 
legal scholarship has not addressed what minimum protections the 
act provides,56 and has instead focused on the more amorphous 
question regarding whether or not the Act can be construed to 
include things such as price controls for drugs.57  These questions 
aside, the Act’s legislative history and plain language conclusively 
demonstrate, at a minimum, that march-in rights were intended to 
provide the public with at least some level of protection.  The issue this 
Comment seeks to address is just how broadly courts and 
administrative agencies should read those protections in light of the 
text of the Act and its aforementioned history. 
B.  Procedural Hurdles to Exercising March-in Rights 
Federal regulations set forth a detailed, multi-step process for 
 
 54  See id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a). 
 55  See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before 
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 135 
(1980) (letter from Ralph Nader) (“the present bill relies heavily on such ‘march-in 
rights’ to protect the public”); Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing 
on H.R. 6933 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong. 355 (1980) (statement of Mr. Bremer, Pres., Society of Univ. Patent 
Administrators) (“the public is adequately protected through appropriate march-in 
provisions”); The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 414 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congress 56 (1980) (letter from Elmer B. 
Staats, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S.):  
The Department [of Energy] believes that march-in rights, although 
available to the Government for more than 10 years, have not been 
utilized because [problems arising from granting patent rights to 
government contractors] are illusionary and not actual.  If and when 
negative effects result from allowing a contractor to retain title to an invention of 
commercial importance, march-in rights are there to address them.  Otherwise 
DOE believes they will never be used.  
(emphasis added). 
 56  See Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 660 (“Congress uniformly viewed march-in 
rights as the mechanism (along with recoupment provisions) to protect the public.”). 
 57  Id. at 640–41 (arguing that the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that 
march-in rights were intended as a mechanism for enforcing reasonable drug 
prices).  But cf. Raubitscheck & Latker, supra note 26, at 150 (arguing that the march-
in rights provision was not intended as a price control mechanism).  The NIH 
resolved this dispute in Raubitschek and Latker’s favor in rendering its decisions 
regarding the Norvir and Xalatan march-in petitions.  See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
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initiating a march-in proceeding.58  The process is lengthy,59 
potentially making it a poor mechanism to respond to an emergency 
situation.60  The procedure is so time consuming, in fact, that some 
commentators have suggested that it may effectively defeat the Act’s 
substantive goals of protecting public health and safety—goals which 
are, by their nature, time-sensitive.61  Some legislators raised similar 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of march-in rights as a 
protection for the public during Congressional debates.  One 
Congressman went so far as to describe march-in rights as “a paper 
tiger,” and he argued that “we can forget [about march-in rights] as a 
realistic protection for the public.”62 
One should be careful, however, not to conflate concerns 
 
 58  37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012).  
 59  The regulations require that when “an agency receives information it believes 
might warrant the exercise of march-in rights” (either on its own or, more likely, 
upon petition by some party) that the agency “shall notify the contractor in writing of 
the information and request informal written or oral comments from the contractor 
as well as information relevant to the matter.”  Id. § 401.6(b).  The agency must 
provide the contractor with thirty days to respond.  Id.  Once the agency receives the 
contractor’s response it may initiate march-in procedures within sixty days.  Id.  
Within thirty days after receiving written notice of the proposed march-in proceeding 
the contractor may submit information opposing the proposed march-in.  Id. § 
401.6(d).  If the agency determines that the contractor’s information raises a factual 
dispute it must undertake a fact-finding process that gives the contractor the 
opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documents, present witnesses, and 
question individuals presented by the agency.  Id. § 401.6(d), (e).  The contractor 
may request to present oral and written arguments.  Id.  Within ninety days after the 
completion of the fact-finding or oral arguments the agency must provide a written 
decision.  Id. § 401.6(g).  If the agency decides to exercise its march-in rights the 
contractor may appeal to the court of federal claim within sixty days which holds the 
agency’s decision in abeyance.  Id. § 401.6(j).  A decision not to exercise march-in 
rights is not reviewable by the courts.  37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012). 
 60  See Information on the Government’s Right to Assert Ownership Control over Federally 
Funded Inventions, 2009 WL 2232908, GAO-09-742, 15 (Gov’t Accountability Office 
July 27, 2009) (“march-in authority could have limited utility in an emergency 
situation, such as an important public health issue” due to the lengthy and time 
consuming process of exercising those rights) [hereinafter GAO report].   
 61  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311 (“The tolerance for protracted delays 
inherent in the current [march-in] process is at odds with the time-sensitive nature 
of the interests reflected in the substantive standard, such as achieving practical 
application of the invention ‘within a reasonable time’ and ‘alleviat[ing] health or 
safety needs.’”) (citations omitted). 
 62  See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before 
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Security of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 
55 (1980) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations) 
(“The Government does not use its march-in rights one in a million times. . . .  I 
think that it is a paper tiger.  I think we can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic 
protection for the public.”).   
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regarding the effectiveness of march-in rights as a protection for the 
public with the legal standards set forth in the Act which determine if 
a march-in is warranted.  Concerns regarding the march-in rights’ 
procedural hurdles and overall effectiveness as a means of public 
protection are persuasive evidence in favor of reforming the Act.63  
These concerns, however, are distinct from the legal issue of what 
circumstances should trigger an exercise of the march-in provision 
and whether the legal standard set forth in the Act has been properly 
understood and applied by the NIH in the Fabrazyme case and other 
past march-in petitions.64 
C.  Previous March-in Petitions 
1.  In re Cellpro (1997) 
In the 1980s a Johns Hopkins University (“Hopkins”) researcher, 
Dr. Curt Civin, isolated an antibody found only on stem cells known 
as My-10.65  His research was funded in part by the NIH and resulted 
in three patents which had potential application to the treatment of 
cancer.66  Separately, researchers at CellPro, Inc. isolated a related, 
but different, antibody known as the 12.8 antibody.67  The 12.8 
antibody is structurally similar to the My-10 antibody, but has the 
advantage of being able to link physically to baboon cells, which the 
My-10 antibody is unable to do.68  This advantage enabled CellPro to 
obtain FDA approval for use of its 12.8 antibody in cancer treatments 
before Hopkins was able to do the same for its My-10 antibody.69  
Hopkins subsequently sued CellPro alleging willful infringement of 
its patents.70 
Before trial, CellPro petitioned the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, requesting that the Secretary exercise 
the government’s march-in rights.71  The Secretary forwarded the 
petition to the NIH because the NIH was the agency that funded the 
 
 63  See infra text accompanying note 171. 
 64  This Comment will focus on the latter issue.  For articles considering the 
procedural hurdles, see, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5; GAO report, supra note 
60. 
 65  See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D. Del. 1996). 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  See CellPro Determination, supra note 15. 
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research resulting in the My-10 patents.72  In the petition, CellPro 
sought an order which would require Hopkins to license CellPro the 
patents, asserting that such action was necessary because of health 
and safety needs or, in the alternative, because Hopkins had failed to 
achieve practical application of its patents.73 
First, the NIH determined whether Hopkins had taken effective 
steps to achieve practical application of the patents.74  The agency 
concluded that Hopkins achieved practical applications because its 
sub-licensee, Baxter Healthcare Corporation, was manufacturing a 
device based on the patents, despite the fact that the device was still 
awaiting regulatory approval by the FDA.75  The agency also cited the 
fact that CellPro had failed to negotiate a license from Hopkins, 
which the agency felt was persuasive evidence that the free market 
had decided against the need for CellPro’s product.76  Second, the 
NIH examined whether a health or safety need existed that Hopkins 
or its licensees/sub-licensees were not reasonably satisfying.77  The 
agency determined that the fact that CellPro had an FDA-approved 
medical device on the market was enough to meet the health-need 
prong of the march-in rights provision, writing that it would be 
“premature[] and inappropriate for the NIH to substitute its 
judgment for that of clinicians and patients seeking to avail 
themselves of an FDA-approved medical device” and that the device 
“fulfills a health need for those who wish to use it.”78  Thus, the NIH’s 
bar for what constitutes a “health or safety need” within the meaning 
of the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in provision is extremely low.  There 
need only be a device or drug on the market that patients wish to use 
to satisfy that prong, and the NIH will not “substitute its judgment”79 
for that of clinicians and patients who wish to use the drug or 
device.80 
The NIH ultimately determined, however, that the health or 
safety need was reasonably satisfied in this case.81  The NIH relied on 
the district court, in the patent infringement litigation between 
 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See CellPro Determination, supra note 15. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
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Hopkins and CellPro,82 which had entered an injunction allowing the 
continuing sale of CellPro’s cancer treatment device until the FDA 
approved the Hopkins/Baxter product for sale.83  The NIH also relied 
upon the pledge of Baxter, Hopkin’s sublicensee, to increase patient 
access in clinical trials to its device in the event that CellPro reduced 
the sale of its device.84  Therefore, the NIH reasoned, march-in 
proceedings were not warranted because Baxter had taken 
reasonable steps to satisfy the existing health and safety needs created 
by the existence of CellPro’s cancer treatment.85 
Scholarly reaction to the NIH’s CellPro decision has been 
mixed.86  Some have applauded the decision as a proper exercise of 
restraint, citing the fact that the statutory language of the march-in 
provision requires that action must be “necessary” in order to justify 
the exercise of march-in rights.87  Others have been more critical, 
arguing that the NIH’s determination “not only flies in the face of the 
legislative history [of the Act], [but that] it is also flatly inconsistent 
with the language of the Act itself, the ‘policy and objective’ of which 
are explained in the Act’s introductory paragraph.”88 
Even if one finds the NIH’s decision in the CellPro case 
convincing, such support by no means compels the conclusion that 
the NIH was similarly correct in the Fabrazyme case because the facts 
of the two cases are markedly different and easily distinguishable.89  
First, the cancer patients at issue in the CellPro case had a multitude 
of different treatment options available,90 whereas Fabrazyme is the 
only treatment available for Fabry disease patients in the United 
 
 82  See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 83  See Cellpro Determination, supra note 15. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  See, e.g., McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1097–98; Arno & Davis, supra note 
26, at 683; see also Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That Patenting and 
Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 375, 388–89 (2000). 
 87  See McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1097–98 (describing march-in authority 
as a “blunt and powerful means to ensure that government funded technology does 
not languish to the detriment of the public”). 
 88  Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 683; see also Mikhail, supra note 86, at 388–89 
(arguing that the NIH “ignored the link between health needs and usage by 
hospitals” in assessing whether or not Baxter’s device, in clinical trial, could be said 
to be reasonably satisfying the health need created by CellPro’s device). 
 89  Compare CellPro Determination, supra note 15, with Fabrazyme Determination, 
supra note 15.  
 90  CellPro Determination, supra note 15. 
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States.91  Second, there was no evidence that patient access to the 
CellPro device had been curtailed, as the district court’s injunction 
allowed CellPro to continue selling its device until Baxter achieved 
FDA approval and Baxter promised to expand access to its device in 
clinical trials if CellPro reduced production of its device.92  By 
contrast, Genzyme Corporation produces the only drug available in 
the United States for the treatment of Fabry disease and the drug 
shortage has limited patient access.93  Finally, in the CellPro case the 
drug producer petitioned the NIH because of impending patent 
litigation, whereas in the Fabry disease case a group of patients 
petitioned due to their lack of access to a lifesaving drug.94  Thus, the 
question presented to the NIH in the CellPro case was a substantially 
closer question than in the Fabrazyme case.  Even if one supports the 
NIH’s decision in the CellPro case, this does not preclude the 
conclusion that the NIH’s determination in the Fabrazyme case was 
incorrect. 
2.  In re Norvir (2004) and In re Xalatan (2004) 
Both the Norvir and Xalatan petitions challenged dramatic 
increases in the price of their respective drugs.95  The primary thrust 
of both petitions was that the high prices of these drugs, especially 
when considered in light of the already large public investment made 
in their development, rendered them essentially unavailable to the 
public on the “reasonable terms” required by the Bayh-Dole Act.96  
The petitions also argued, in the alternative, that the dramatic 
increase in prices created a public health and safety issue, 
necessitating a march-in.97 
Regarding the allegation that the dramatic increase in prices 
created a health or safety issue, the NIH’s response in both petitions 
was short and practically identical: 
[The drug] has been approved by the Food and Drug 
 
 91  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.  
 92  CellPro Determination, supra note 15. 
 93  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.  
 94  Id. 
 95  See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note 
15. 
 96  See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note 
15.  This argument seems to be modeled after the reasonable pricing theory 
advanced in Arno and Davis’s article, discussed supra note 26. 
 97  See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note 
15.   
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Administration as safe and effective and is being widely 
prescribed by physicians. . . . No evidence has been 
presented that march-in could alleviate any health or safety 
needs that are not reasonably satisfied by [Pfizer/Abbot].  
Rather, the argument advanced is that the product should 
be available at [a lower price/the same price as that 
charged in other countries], which is addressed below.  
Thus, the NIH concludes that [Pfizer/Abbot] has met the 
statutory and regulatory standard for health or safety 
needs.98 
The NIH also wrote that “the extraordinary remedy of march-in 
is not an appropriate means for controlling prices” and that the issue 
is “appropriately left for Congress to address legislatively,”99 which 
seems to implicitly reject the argument some scholars have 
advanced—that the march-in rights provision was intended as a price-
control mechanism.100  In coming to this conclusion, however, the 
NIH did not even bother to address the statutory language of the Act, 
which requires that results of federal funding be “available to the 
public on reasonable terms.”101  As in the CellPro determination, the 
NIH in both the Norvir and Xalatan cases seemed more concerned 
with upsetting settled expectations of patent holders than in 
protecting the public interest. 
It is certainly debatable, as a legal matter, whether the march-in 
provision was intended as a price-control mechanism.102  That said, 
however, it is worth noting that the NIH did not even mention in its 
Norvir and Xalatan determinations the possibility that the 
congressional intent and statutory language of the Bayh-Dole Act may 
require it to protect the public from high drug prices;103 nor did it 
mention its statutory duty to ensure that the products of publicly-
funded inventions are available to the public on reasonable terms.104  
 
 98  Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 5; see also Xalatan Determination, 
supra note 15, at 5.  
 99  Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 5–6.  The NIH’s response in the 
Xalatan determination was practically identical.  See Xalatan Determination, supra 
note 15. 
 100  See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note 
15; see also Arno & Davis supra note 26. 
 101  35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2006); see also Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 4; 
Xalatan Determination, supra note 15, at 4. 
 102  See discussion supra note 57. 
 103  See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15; Norvir Determination, supra note 
15. 
 104  See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15; Norvir Determination, supra note 
15. 
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Additionally, the NIH wrote off any safety concerns posed by the high 
price of these drugs in one paragraph.105  This is persuasive evidence 
that the NIH has not seriously considered its march-in authority and 
that it is instead more concerned with ensuring that patent holders’ 
settled expectations remain undisturbed. 
III.  THE FABRY DISEASE CASE 
Fabry disease is a rare, painful, and ultimately lethal genetic 
disorder.106  The community of Fabry disease patients recently had to 
endure a severe health crisis: the only FDA-approved treatment for 
the disease, an enzyme replacement therapy known as Fabrazyme, 
went into extremely short supply for nearly three years starting in 
June 2009.107  Fabrazyme was developed with federal funds from the 
NIH and is subject to the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act.108  Despite 
the health emergency that this drug shortage caused, the NIH, 
responding to a petition by a group of patients in need of greater 
access to the drug, refused to exercise the primary public protection 
mechanism entrusted to it by the Bayh-Dole Act: the march-in rights 
power.109  The Agency’s determination in this case was not only legally 
incorrect; it also prolonged the ongoing pain and suffering of the 
Fabry disease community.  In order to prevent similar drug shortages 
in the future, either the NIH must revisit its mistakenly narrow 
interpretation of its march-in power, or Congress must reform the 
Act to better effectuate its goal of protecting the public health from 
the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions derived from taxpayer 
dollars. 
Fabry disease is a rare X-linked recessive lysosomal storage 
disease.110  Individuals who suffer from the disease have a deficiency 
of the enzyme alpha galactosidase, which normally breaks down a 
 
 105  See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15, at 6; Norvir Determination, supra 
note 15, at 5–6. 
 106  Julie K. Karen et al., Angiokeratoma Corporis Diffusum (Fabry Disease), 11 
DERMATOLOGY ONLINE J. 4, 8 (2005), http://dermatology.cdlib.org/114 
/NYU/NYUtexts/0419054.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).  
 107  See Susan Donaldson James, Fabry Disease Patients Get Sicker as Drugs Go Overseas, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ 
fabry-disease-patients-sicker-sue-drug-company lifesaving/story?id=14403759 (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 108  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 4. 
 109  Id. at 1, 9. 
 110  Karen, supra note 106, at 8.   
O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:26 PM 
1420 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1403 
 
certain fat known as globotriasylcermide.111  The inability to break 
down this fat causes it to accumulate in the blood vessels, tissues, and 
organs, impairing their functions and resulting in a wide range of 
symptoms.112  These symptoms include renal disease, heart disease, 
dermatological problems, ocular disease, burning extremity pain, 
tinnitus, and an increased risk of stroke.113  Fabry disease significantly 
shortens the life of its sufferers: one NIH study found that fifty 
percent of those patients not treated by enzyme replacement therapy 
developed end-stage renal failure by age fifty-three.114  All patients in 
the study who did live into their fifties eventually developed end-stage 
renal failure.115 
Although there is no cure for Fabry disease, an effective therapy 
using the biologic agalsidase beta (Fabrazyme) was discovered in 
2001.116  While not a cure, regular infusion of the drug can allow 
normal metabolism and even prevent disease progression.117  The 
discovery was a direct result of the NIH’s funding of grant number 
DK 34045, awarded to Dr. Robert J. Desnick at the Mt. Sinai School of 
Medicine.118  The resulting patent was exclusively licensed to 
Genzyme, Inc., which until 2009 was able to produce enough 
Fabrazyme to meet the needs of all Fabry disease patients in the 
United States.119  Fabrazyme is currently the only FDA-approved 
enzyme replacement therapy for Fabry disease patients in the United 
States.120 
 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id.; see also Petition In re Fabrazyme, Manufactured by Genzyme Corp., (Jan. 
13, 2010)  p. 3, available at http://patentlawyersite.com/files/Download
 /Fabrazyme_Petition_5_0.doc (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Fabry Disease 
Patients’ Petition]. 
 114  Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113, at 3. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 4; see also Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 6; Fabrazyme 
Approval Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Director of the Office of Compliance and 
Biologics Quality at the Food and Drug Administration, to Christine Harris, Manager 
of Regulatory Affairs at Genzyme Corporation (Apr. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/ucm128159.h
tm. 
 117  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 4–5. 
 118  Id. at 4.  Fabrazyme is therefore an invention subject to the provisions of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which was not disputed by Genzyme or the NIH. 
 119  Id. at 4–5. 
 120  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7–9.  One other enzyme 
replacement therapy, agalside alpha (trade name Replagal) is available outside the 
United States and was seeking FDA approval in the United States, but has since 
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In June 2009, Genzyme was forced to decrease production of 
Fabrazyme as a result of a viral infection at its manufacturing plant.121  
In November 2009, Genzyme produced a contaminated batch of the 
drug.122  The FDA initiated action against Genzyme resulted in a 
consent decree, $175 million in fines as profit disgorgement, and 
oversight of the manufacture of Fabrazyme for at least seven years.123  
In response, Genzyme instituted a rationing protocol, which allotted 
Fabry patients with one dose of the drug every other month, 
compared to the two per month normally prescribed.124  Moreover, 
newly diagnosed patients were not allowed any drug whatsoever.125  
Genzyme also allocated only thirty-eight percent of what meager 
supply of Fabrazyme it had been able to produce to U.S. citizens, with 
the rest being distributed to other countries.126 
In response to Genzyme’s production problems, a group of 
Fabry disease patients petitioned the NIH requesting that the agency 
exercise its march-in rights and grant an open license so that a third 
party could make up the production shortfall.127  The NIH denied this 
request on December 2, 2010.128  The primary reason that the NIH 
cited was the fact that no third party would likely be able to gain 
regulatory approval to produce a drug similar to Fabrazyme before 
Genzyme could restart production.129  The NIH placed particular 
reliance upon Genzyme’s predication that supply would be fully 
restored in the first half of 2011 and that a competitor, Shire, was 
seeking FDA approval of its own enzyme replacement therapy, 
Replagal.130 
Despite Genzyme’s promises to the NIH and the Fabry disease 
community that it would resume production in early 2011, on March 
23, 2011, the company announced that it was pushing back full 
resumption of production to the summer of 2011 due to continuing 
 
withdrawn its application.  See James, supra note 107. 
 121  Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113, at 4. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  See Thomas Gryta, Genzyme Sees End to Fabrazyme Rationing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
16, 2010) http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703743504575494210148662260.html 
 125  Id. 
 126  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7. 
 127  See generally Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113. 
 128  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2, 9–10; see also discussion 
infra Part IV. 
 129  Id. at 9. 
 130  Id.   
O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:26 PM 
1422 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1403 
 
viral contamination problems.131  Yet again, on August 26, 2011, 
production was delayed, with Genzyme issuing an apology to the 
Fabry disease community.132  Moreover, a study by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) concluded that the pattern of adverse 
events the patients were suffering following lowered doses of 
Fabrazyme may actually have been an “accelerated[] course of Fabry 
disease.”133  The EMA thus required that Genzyme provide enough of 
the drug to allow full doses to Europeans.134  Genzyme complied, 
shifting more drugs overseas and away from U.S. patients, despite the 
availability of Replagal overseas.135  Adding to the shortage crisis, 
Shire has since withdrawn its application for FDA approval of 
Replagal, meaning that there is no chance that U.S. patients will be 
able to access that drug as the NIH predicted in its determination.136 
In response to these continuing developments, a group of Fabry 
disease patients requested that the NIH reconsider its decision not to 
march-in.137  The group has also requested that the FDA ban overseas 
shipment of the drug in order to free up more supply for U.S. 
patients.138  Finally, the patients have sued Genzyme for damages, 
alleging a novel, implied cause of action arising from the Bayh-Dole 
Act: that Genzyme unreasonably used a publicly-funded invention to 
cause public harm.139  They allege that some Fabry disease patients 
have died as a result of Genzyme’s drug rationing during the nearly 
 
 131  See Robert Weisman, Genzyme Has to Scrap Batch of its Fabrazyme Drug, BOS. 
GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2011, 4:30PM), http://www.boston.com/business/ticker
/2011/03/genzyme_has_to.html. 
 132  See Alina Selyukh, Genzyme Apologizes for a Drug Shipment Delay, REUTERS (Sept. 
7, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/07/genzyme-fda-
idUSN1E78613C20110907 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
 133  See EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE SHORTAGE OF FABRAZYME 7–
8 (2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library
/Other/2010/11/WC500099241.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 134  Id. 
 135  See Amended Complaint at 9, Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 11-0313 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2011). 
 136  See James, supra note 107.   
 137  See Petition for Rehearing and Rulemaking, In re Fabrazyme (Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs. Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.patentlawyersite.com/files/Download
/NIH%20PETITION%20FOR%20RULEMAKING%20AND%20REHEARING%209.
pdf 
%20PETITION%20FOR%20RULEMAKING%20AND%20REHEARING%209.pdf; see 
also James, supra note 21. 
 138  See Ed Silverman, Patients Petition FDA over Genzyme Drug Shortage, PHARMALOT 
(Jan. 19, 2011, 10:25 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/01/patients-petition-
fda-over-genzyme-drug-shortage/. 
 139  See Amended Complaint, supra note 135, at 23. 
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three-year shortage.140 
The patients’ request for NIH reconsideration has likely been 
rendered moot given that Genzyme achieved FDA approval of its new 
manufacturing facility in January 2012 and resumed full production 
in March 2012.141  The shortage, therefore, lasted more than a full 
year beyond Genzyme’s initial prediction, on which the NIH heavily 
relied in its decision.142 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH-IN PETITION AND NIH DETERMINATION 
The NIH determined that exercising its march-in power in 
response to health and safety concerns was not warranted on three 
grounds.143  First, the NIH argued that a march-in proceeding 
granting license of the Fabrazyme patents to a responsible third party 
would not increase the supply of Fabrazyme in the short term 
because it would take years for any third party’s production facility to 
achieve FDA approval.144  Second, the NIH cited the fact that no third 
party had presented itself as seeking FDA approval for an alternative 
to Fabrazyme.145  In making this point, the NIH anticipated a counter 
argument—that no third party would conduct clinical trials or seek 
FDA approval of an alternative to Fabrazyme because this would leave 
those companies open to a patent infringement suit.146  The NIH 
responded by arguing that Genzyme’s patents are not an impediment 
to a third party seeking regulatory approval because clinical trials are 
exempt from infringement under the Hatch-Waxman statutory safe-
harbor provision.147  Finally, the NIH cited the fact that Genzyme had 
 
 140  Id. 
 141  See Albertina Torsoli, Sanofi’s Genzyme Receives FDA Approval of Framingham 
Plant, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com
/news/2012-01-24/sanofi-s-genzyme-receives-fda-approval-of-framingham-plant.html.  
 142  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that Genzyme 
predicted full production would resume in the first quarter of 2011). 
 143  See infra text accompanying notes 144–49. 
 144  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2.  The NIH emphasized the 
difficult and lengthy process of obtaining FDA approval for a biological product such 
as Fabrazyme to market, irrespective of any patent rights.  Id.  Specifically, any new 
biological product must complete FDA Investigational New Drug (IND) and Biologic 
License Application (BLA) approval processes.  See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 54, 56, 
210, 211, 312, 600, 601, 606 (2006) (describing various points of the approval process 
facing any organization seeking to produce a Fabrazyme competitor).   
 145  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2.  
 146  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 147  Id. at 1.  The Hatch-Waxman statutory safe harbor provision exempts 
companies from liability for patent infringement claims if their use is “reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law 
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promised to resume full production of Fabrazyme in the first half of 
2011, and that Genzyme was working diligently and in good faith to 
make good on its promise.148  The NIH also noted, in a break from 
the previous three decisions, that it would monitor the shortage of 
Fabrazyme and re-evaluate its decision if it received information 
suggesting either that progress toward restoring the supply of 
Fabrazyme to meet patient demand was not proceeding as 
represented by Genzyme, or that a third party with a viable plan to 
obtain FDA approval to market an alternative to Fabrazyme presented 
itself.149 
The NIH’s application of the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in provision 
to the facts of this case was mistaken for several reasons.  First, its 
reasoning was circular and set up a self-fulfilling prophecy because 
the Hatch-Waxman statutory safe-harbor provision extends only to 
actions taken to achieve regulatory approval, not to actions taken to 
bring a product to market.150  Thus, to bring a product to market, a 
company would have to be granted a compulsory license by the NIH 
via a march-in (or perhaps negotiate a license with the patent 
holder).  Second, the agency’s decision ignores the plain language of 
the Act as well as the congressional intent underlying that language.  
Third, and similarly, the NIH’s decision effectively defeats one of the 
Act’s principal goals—to protect the public from the nonuse or 
unreasonable use of publicly funded inventions—by reading the legal 
standard in such a way that it can essentially never be met by any set 
of facts.  If the public is to receive any protection from drug shortages 
resulting from patent monopolies151 then either the NIH must re-
evaluate its mistaken legal reasoning, or Congress must amend the 
Bayh-Dole Act to offer greater public protection—lest the 
circumstances of the Fabrazyme case be repeated in the future. 
The NIH’s reasoning in the Fabrazyme determination is circular 
because it places primary emphasis on the fact that no third party had 
presented itself as ready to achieve regulatory approval for an 
 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.”  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Safe Harbor Provision).  Thus, as per the NIH’s reasoning, a company 
seeking FDA approval of a Fabrazyme competitor would not have to fear a patent 
infringement suit brought by Genzyme because they would be protected by Hatch-
Waxman while they were developing the drug.  See generally Merck KGaA v. InTegra 
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2005). 
 148  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 149  Id. 
 150  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 151  These are drugs whose development was funded by the public, no less. 
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alternative to Fabrazyme. But, in refusing to march-in on those 
grounds, the NIH effectively created a situation where no third party 
will ever present itself—a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The NIH argued 
that a third party should be willing to seek FDA approval of a 
competing drug even without a march-in because it can do so without 
fear of a patent infringement suit under the Hatch-Waxman statutory 
safe-harbor provision.152  The NIH’s reasoning, however, overlooks 
the fact that simply because a company hypothetically could seek FDA 
approval without infringing upon the Fabrazyme patents and then 
request a march-in does not by extension mean that a company will 
do so.  Indeed, companies will almost certainly not seek regulatory 
approval of a competing product absent a march-in first because 
bringing a product to market is not exempt from patent infringement 
suits by the safe-harbor provision.153  Although the Hatch-Waxman 
safe-harbor provision exempts actions that are related to seeking 
regulatory approval, that safety does not extend to selling the product 
on the open market after regulatory approval is achieved.154  Thus, 
the NIH expects a company to seek FDA approval of a competing 
(and patent-infringing) drug, and then request that the NIH march-
in and compel the granting of a patent license so it can sell its drug 
on the open market.  This asks a company to take on the great risk of 
investing a large sum of money in achieving regulatory approval and 
then hoping that the NIH marches-in and grants a compulsory 
license.  Especially in light of the fact that no government agency has 
ever used its march-in authority,155 it should not be surprising that no 
company has endeavored to do this, thereby fulfilling the NIH’s 
prophecy.156 
Certainly, a march-in would not guarantee that a third party 
would immediately present itself as ready and willing to produce a 
competing product.  But marching-in first, before a company decides 
to seek regulatory approval, dramatically lessens the risk that any 
 
 152  See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 153  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 154  See id. (exempting companies from liability for patent infringement claims if 
their actions are “reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products”). 
 155  See McCabe, supra note 14, at 649. 
 156  Indeed, the NIH’s determination seems to implicitly recognize this, stating 
that it will reconsider its decision “in the unlikely event” that they receive information 
that a third party has presented itself as ready and willing to seek regulatory approval 
of a competing drug.  Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 16, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
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company contemplating this course of action would have to take on, 
and would therefore drastically increase the chances that such a 
company might present itself.  Thus, the NIH’s reasoning is circular: 
by declining to march-in until a third party has presented itself, it has 
effectively guaranteed that no such party will ever appear.  This limits 
the scope of march-in authority so drastically as to effectively read it 
out of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
The NIH’s reasoning also ignores the Bayh-Dole Act’s plain 
language and Congress’s intent.  As a preliminary matter, the 
underproduction of Fabrazyme clearly constitutes a “health or safety 
need[]” within the meaning of the Act.157  This view is supported by 
the NIH’s determination in the CellPro case, where the agency 
determined that the choice of any patient or doctor to utilize a 
particular product creates a health or safety need, and that the NIH 
will not second guess these decisions.158  It is also clear that these 
health and safety needs are not being “reasonably satisfied”159 by 
Genzyme, as the underproduction of Fabrazyme has allegedly 
resulted in an accelerated course of the disease and the deaths of 
three patients.160  Although not clearly stated by the NIH, the only 
limiting language available in the Act to support the view that a 
march-in is not appropriate is the requirement that action on the 
part of the federal funding agency be “necessary to alleviate” the 
unmet health or safety needs.161  The NIH, in stating that it will not 
march-in absent a third party achieving regulatory approval of a 
competing drug, is interpreting the Act to require that the agency be 
the last party to take action in the multi-step process required to 
bring a competing drug to market.  Thus, the NIH is interpreting 
“necessary” as meaning strictly necessary. 
This interpretation of when action is “necessary” is not a valid 
means of statutory interpretation.  Such an interpretation would 
make action on the part of the NIH both necessary and sufficient to 
alleviate the unmet health need.162  Regardless of the fact that there is 
 
 157  35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
 158  See supra text accompanying notes 77–80. 
 159  35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 
 160  See Fabry Patients’ Petition, supra note 113. 
 161  35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
 162  Additionally, this author could find no cases in any context which have 
construed a statute’s use of the word “necessary” to mean absolutely necessary.  
Indeed, in the context of constitutional law the Supreme Court has written that “the 
word ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely necessary.’”  United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (discussing the Necessary and Proper clause). 
O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE)10/22/2013  2:26 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1427 
 
no third party, a march-in is still a necessary (though not sufficient) 
predicate action to allow any third party, whether present or not, to 
legally produce a Fabrazyme competitor.  Without an exercise of the 
NIH’s march-in authority, the health and safety needs of the Fabry 
community will go unmet, and action by the NIH is “necessary” to 
alleviate those needs.  In fact, considering the history of march-in 
proceedings since Bayh-Dole’s enactment, most third parties would 
be right to assume that the NIH will never march in, and thus decide 
not to attempt to produce a Fabrazyme competitor because the 
chance of receiving a compelled license via a march-in is effectively 
zero.  Therefore, the NIH’s granting of an open license under its 
march-in authority is “necessary” in order to motivate third parties. 
The NIH, however, did not engage in such a close examination 
of the statutory language in deciding the scope of its march-in 
authority, and instead simply stated that a march-in was not 
appropriate.163  Notwithstanding its limited analysis, its determination 
still ignored the Act’s clear congressional intent.  One of the Act’s 
principal goals, expressed in the “Policy and Objective” section, is to 
“protect the public against the nonuse or unreasonable use of 
inventions . . . .”164  As noted, the Act’s sponsors viewed march-in 
rights as the primary mechanism to effectuate this goal.165  The Act’s 
proponents argued that “the public is adequately protected through 
appropriate march-in provisions.”166  In commenting on the bill, the 
Department of Energy viewed a march-in as unlikely, but noted that 
“[i]f and when negative effects result from allowing a contractor to 
retain title to an invention of commercial importance, march-in 
rights are there to address them.”167  Contemporary legal scholarship, 
 
 163  See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15. 
 164  35 U.S.C. § 200. 
 165  See discussion supra note 55. 
 166  Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before the 
Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of  the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 355 
(1980) (statement of Mr. Bremer, Pres., Soc’y of Univ. Patent Adm’rs) (“the public is 
adequately protected through appropriate march-in provisions”). 
 167  The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 414 Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congress 56 (1980) (letter from Elmer B. Staats, 
Comptroller Gen. of the U.S.).  Mr. Staats further elaborated that:  
The Department [of Energy] believes that march-in rights, although 
available to the Government for more than 10 years, have not been 
utilized because [problems arising from granting patent rights to 
government contractors] are illusionary and not actual.  If and when 
negative effects result from allowing a contractor to retain title to an invention of 
commercial importance, march-in rights are there to address them.  Otherwise 
DOE believes they will never be used.  
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in reviewing the legislative history of the Act, has similarly concluded 
that march-in rights were viewed as the primary means of protecting 
the public.168  In the Fabry case, the unreasonable use of a federally 
funded invention caused a great health and safety need, but the NIH 
ignored the primary mechanism inserted into the Act to ensure such 
need was met.  The NIH’s interpretation of its legal authority has 
thus defeated the public protection goal of the Act by ignoring the 
mechanism intended to further that goal. 
The NIH, however, has the ability to correct its mistaken 
interpretation.  The agency has been petitioned by the Fabry patients 
again, requesting a reconsideration of the march-in determination 
and a rule clarification.169  At this point, given that the FDA has 
cleared Genzyme’s new production facility, an NIH march-in is 
almost certain not to occur.  The NIH should, however, issue a rule 
clarification correcting its prior mistaken determination in order to 
send a message that the Bayh-Dole Act’s public protection measures 
are functional and to make clear that it will exercise its march-in 
authority in future drug-shortage cases.  The NIH should do so not 
only because its legal determination was incorrect, but because two 
factual assumptions upon which it heavily relied (that Genzyme 
would resume full production in the first half of 2011 and that 
Replagal would be made widely available in the United States) were 
proven to be completely wrong.170  A reconsideration of its 
determination will at least serve as a reminder to other holders of 
publically funded patent monopolies that if they abuse the invention 
which has been entrusted to them by taxpayers the NIH still has the 
will to march-in.  If the NIH adheres to its mistaken view it will have 
sent a message to pharmaceutical companies everywhere that in the 
event of a large-scale drug shortage their patents are not in danger.  
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 168  See Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the 
Hopkins v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 218–19 
(2000) (arguing that balancing public versus private benefits is a primary concern of 
the Bayh-Dole Act and that march-in rights exist in order to protect the public 
welfare).   
 169  See In re Fabrazyme, supra note 137, at 3; see also James, supra note 21. 
 170  Compare Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that Genzyme 
had promised to resume full production in the first half of 2011), with Stovall, supra 
note 25 (noting that full production of Fabrazyme will not resume until at least 
March 2012): also compare Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that 
Shire was seeking FDA approval for its Fabry disease treatment, Replagal) with James, 
supra note 107 (noting that Shire has withdrawn its application for FDA approval of 
Replagal). 
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A return to the Act’s original intent will provide additional 
motivation to holders of publicly funded patent monopolies to avoid 
the mistakes made by Genzyme. 
V.  BAYH-DOLE REFORM 
Unfortunately, the possibility of the NIH revisiting its 
determination to correct its mistaken legal interpretation of its 
march-in authority may fairly be described as unlikely, at best.  The 
NIH’s likely adherence to its mistaken interpretation of its legal 
authority, coupled with the lengthy procedure required to exercise 
the march-in power, demonstrates the need for reform. 
As noted, the lengthy march-in procedure limits its utility in an 
emergency situation, such as a drug shortage.171  Especially when one 
considers that FDA approval172 would have to be satisfied as well as the 
march-in procedures, the ability of the Act’s march-in rights provision 
to offer adequate public protections in public health emergencies is 
even more severely curtailed.173  The Fabry disease community’s 
plight is a vivid illustration of this.  The mistaken determination by 
the NIH, coupled with the march-in right’s limited utility in an 
emergency situation, served to defeat the ability of the Act to 
effectuate its goal of protecting the public health and safety.  Indeed, 
it seems as though the fears that the Act’s detractors expressed while 
the Act was before Congress have been wholly realized: march-in 
rights have become nothing more than a “paper tiger,” offering the 
public nothing more than the appearance of protection from misuse 
of the inventions it funded.174  While march-in rights may have 
previously existed as an existential threat to patent holders after the 
 
 171  See supra text accompanying note 59 describing the march-in procedure. 
 172  See supra text accompanying note 144 describing the FDA-approval process. 
 173  See GAO report, supra note 60, at 15 (“March-in authority could have limited 
utility in an emergency situation such as an important public health issue.”); 
McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1100–10 (“In a case where march-in was justified 
by a health care emergency, the administrative process would likely not be 
expeditious enough to address the situation.”); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 290 
(“The tolerance for protracted delays inherent in the current process is at odds with 
the time-sensitive nature of the interests reflected in the substantive standard, such as 
achieving practical application of the invention ‘within a reasonable time’ and 
‘alleviating health or safety needs.’”). 
 174  See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before 
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong.. 55 
(1980) [hereinafter Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980] (statement of Rep. 
Jack Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations) (“The Government does not 
use its march-in rights one in a million times. . . . I think that it is a paper tiger.  I 
think we can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic protection for the public.”).   
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Fabrazyme decision, it is probably safe for the current holders of 
publicly funded patents to conclude that they have nothing to fear 
from the march-in provision—that the provision constitutes nothing 
more than an empty threat which will never actually be exercised, no 
matter how egregious the harm being inflicted upon the public 
health and safety. 
While the public derives substantial benefit from the Bayh-Dole 
Act’s success in increasing commercialization of publicly funded 
research,175 taxpayers also deserve at least some sort of functional 
mechanism to protect them from the “unreasonable use” of 
inventions funded by taxpayer dollars, especially when such use 
threatens the public health and safety.  If the NIH refuses to ever 
utilize the primary mechanism intended for that purpose—either out 
of concern for the length of the proceedings or sheer lack of political 
will—then the public has no such protection.  Accordingly, Congress 
should enact modest reforms of the Act aimed at two goals: (1) 
specifying with greater clarity what circumstances warrant a march-in; 
and (2) streamlining the procedural hurdles currently encumbering 
the decision to move forward with a march-in, especially in cases 
where the public health or safety is threatened, such as a drug 
shortage like the Fabrazyme case.176 
In the case of a future drug shortage similar to the Fabrazyme 
case, Congress should specify whether or not the presence of a third 
party manufacturer is a necessary pre-condition to a march-in.  
Additionally, in these cases, Congress should consider putting in 
place a procedure under which the NIH and the FDA can work 
cooperatively.  In the Fabrazyme case, for instance, the hurdles of 
achieving FDA approval for an alternative to Fabrazyme likely 
prevented a third party from seeking a patent license compelled by 
the NIH via a march-in.177  In cases where a proven, effective drug 
already exists but is in short supply, Congress should contemplate 
enacting a shorter route to FDA approval by a third party who 
receives a patent license via a march-in in order to restore the drug 
supply as quickly as possible.  This should not raise substantial 
 
 175  See McCabe, supra note 14, at 665–66 (arguing that the public receives 
substantial long term benefits from increased commercialization of publically funded 
research in the form of greater technological development). 
 176  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311 (arguing that the requirement that 
march-in authority be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of all court appeals by 
government contractor should be changed). 
 177  The route to FDA approval for a biological product “highly similar” to a 
product already on the market is currently governed by 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2010). 
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concerns for investors, as march-ins would continue to be rare so 
long as companies avoid undersupplying the market—something 
already in their best interest anyway.178  Additionally, under 
circumstances like the Fabry disease case, the NIH could attach 
reasonable royalty terms to any license compelled under a march-in 
to further defray the risk of lost profits in the event of a drug 
shortage. 
Congress should also streamline the current march-in 
procedure, at least in cases where the public health or safety is 
threatened.  Indeed, as noted previously, the current procedure 
actually serves to defeat the Act’s goal of protecting the public health 
and safety.179  These reforms are modest but would go a long way 
towards restoring the Act’s ability to effectuate its goal of protecting 
the public.  Without these reforms, or the NIH showing greater 
political will to correct its mistaken legal interpretation of the current 
march-in-provision, the march-in rights provision can no long be 
honestly described “as a realistic protection for the public.”180 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In retaining march-in rights over federally funded research, 
Congress endeavored to balance private interests with those of the 
public.  While the Bayh-Dole Act has certainly been successful at one 
of its primary goals—commercializing the products of federally 
funded research—the Fabryazme case demonstrates its failure in 
effectuating another primary goal: protecting the public health and 
safety from the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions funded by 
taxpayer dollars.  This failure is a product of both the NIH’s mistaken 
legal interpretation of the Act and the burdensome nature of the 
march-in process.  The statutory authority does exist for the NIH to 
march-in in the Fabrazyme case, despite its failure to do so.  This case 
is precisely the type of situation Congress intended to remedy by 
 
 178  See GAO report, supra note 60, at 15 (arguing that the potential for an agency 
march-in is far less important to investors than other risks faced when deciding 
whether or not to invest in a product, and noting that investors believe that so long 
as march-ins are rare and licensees are careful to follow the requirements of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, the flow of federally funded inventions to market should not be 
negatively impacted). 
 179  See discussion supra note 61. 
 180  See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980 (statement of Rep. Jack 
Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations) (“The Government does not use its 
march-in rights one in a million times. . . . I think that it is a paper tiger.  I think we 
can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic protection for the public.”).   
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providing for march-in rights.  Accordingly, the NIH should re-
evaluate its determination upon the Fabry patients’ rehearing request 
and issue a rule clarification. 
Absent such a rule clarification by the NIH, Congress should 
reform the Bayh-Dole Act to clarify when a march-in is warranted 
and, most importantly, to streamline the process for doing so.  Such 
reforms would be modest and should be targeted at ensuring that 
statutorily conferred monopolies over life-saving treatments derived 
from federally funded research are not withheld from the public 
again, either intentionally or through negligent mistakes in 
production.  Without these reforms, or a showing of great political 
will by the NIH to correct its legal mistake, march-in rights will cease 
to be even a “paper tiger,” and will offer the public no greater 
protection than mere paper. 
 
